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Abstract
We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European
institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kid-
neys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the mini-
mal quality of the kidney they may receive. Under feasibility constraints, patients'
truthful revelation of reservation values is incompatible with constrained eciency.
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1In the light of this result, we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption on pa-
tients' incentives. Patients choose their revelation strategies as to \protect" them-
selves of bad outcomes and use a lexicographic renement of maximin strategies.
In this environment, if exchanges are pairwise, then priority rules or rules that
maximize a xed ordering provide incentives for the patients to report their true
reservation values. The positive result vanishes if larger exchanges are admitted.
1 Introduction
In the past decade economists have become increasingly more involved in the design of
markets/practical mechanisms (labor market clearinghouses, Roth 2002; power markets,
Wilson 2002; school choice, Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez 1999, 2003). With the recent
seminal paper by Roth et al. (2004), the theory of mechanism design has found an im-
portant application in the design and implementation of matching mechanisms (rules) to
allocate organs for transplantation. The complexity of institutional and feasibility con-
straints, the normative implications and the eects on patients' lives make the task of
designing optimal rules a fascinating challenge.
The best treatment for end-stage kidney failure is kidney transplantation. Kidneys
available for transplantation may be obtained from deceased donors or from willing liv-
ing donors. In October 2008, more than 400,000 people in the US are being treated for
end-stage kidney failure, and more than 76,000 are listed for a deceased donor kidney
transplant. In 2007, there were 16628 kidney transplants in the US, 6041 of those trans-
plants were from living donors.1 Unfortunately, a donated kidney may be unsuitable for
transplantation (incompatible) to a given patient because the mismatch between donor
and patient blood types and tissues would lead to the immediate rejection and loss of the
graft.
In recent years, there has been many proposals to alleviate the (universal) shortage of
kidneys. Some authors as Becker and Elias (2002) present arguments favoring a market
approach, but the medical community is rmly opposed to the application of monetary
1The gures vary signicantly in dierent developed countries. For instance, in the same period, there
were 2211 transplants from deceased donor kidneys and only 137 from living donor for about 6000 patients
on the waiting list in Spain. See Organ Procurement and Transplatantion Network and Organizaci on
Nacional de Transplantes webpages, www.optn.org and www.ont.es.
2incentives to donation.2 In their recent paper, Roth et al. (2004) show however, that mon-
etary transfer between patients and donors may not be necessary to attenuate kidneys
scarcity. The combination of dialysis (an alternative treatment for kidney{failure) and liv-
ing donors generates interesting new protocols. Two incompatible donor{patient couples
may be mutually compatible and a swap of donors between the two couples would result
in two successful transplantations. (Kidney Paired Exchange: KPE).3 Analogously, the
donor's kidney may be transplanted to some patient in the deceased donor kidney waiting
list and her initially intended patient may receive an absolute priority over kidneys in the
cadaveric waiting list. (List Paired Exchange: LPE).4 Further gains can be obtained if
kidney swaps involve more than two donor{patients couples. In fact, simulations carried
out by Roth et al. (2004) suggest that the benets of such an exchange could be very
substantial, increasing live organ donations between unrelated donors from about 54% to
as much as 91% if exchanges among multiple couples are feasible, and to as much as 75%
even if only pairwise exchanges are feasible. In this environment a Central Transplant
Coordinator (CTC) uses kidney assignment rules that taking into account the medical
details of the patients and donors involved in the possible exchanges, propose compat-
ible exchanges among the couples. A key issue when designing these rules is that they
should not provide incentives for the patients to lie about their medical details in order
to improve their chances of getting a match as good as possible.
In subsequent work, Roth et al. (2005a) have proposed a mechanism design approach
to KPE that encompasses the specic features and institutional detail of New England.5
Roth et al. (2005a) assume that patients consider all compatible kidneys as homogeneous
and patients' sets of compatible kidneys are not known to the CTC. Since incentive
constraints imply that all the operations involved in an exchange must be carried out
2In fact, the trade in human organs is a felony under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
of 1984, and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987. On the other hand, Iran has the highest living-
donor rate in the world and it is the only country where monetary compensation for organs is ocially
sanctioned. See \The gap between supply and demand " in The Economist, October 8th, 2008.
3See Delmonico (2004); Delmonico et al. (2004); Segev et al. (2005b); Spital (2004); Segev et al.
(2005a).
4Patients remaining in the cadaveric waiting list would benet as well because the patients who receive
a kidney would drop from it. See Delmonico (2004); Kaplan et al. (2005); Zenios et al. (2001).
5Their proposal is actually been used by the New England Program of Paired Kidney Exchange since
2006. See www.nepke.org and Roth et al. (2005b) for additional details.
3simultaneously, Roth et al. (2005a) consider that only pairwise exchanges between two
donor{patient pairs are feasible. In fact, they prove that priority rules used in real life
ensure that it is a dominant strategy for patients to truthfully reveal both the set of donors
they can receive a kidney from and the set of patientes that their donors can donate a
kidney to.6
Roth et al. (2005a)'s focus on the institutional details of New England restricts the
application of their model to other regions and countries. In Europe and in several areas
of the US, it is generally accepted that patients and doctors do not consider all compatible
kidneys as homogeneous. Many individual characteristics of the donor, like age, health
status, as well as matching characteristics of the donor{patient pair, like HLA mismatches,
are statistically signicant in determining the probability of long{term graft survival and
the quality of life of the patient after the operation.7 Thus, we propose an alternative
approach to KPE that incorporates some important features of the European view on
kidney exchange. First, as Roth et al. (2005a) we assume that there exist feasibility
constraints on the number of simultaneous operations (even if we do not initially restrict
our attention to pairwise exchanges). On the other hand, we departure from Roth et al.
(2005a) in two important aspects.
(i) Following Roth et al. (2004), patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homo-
geneous. Their preferences over available kidneys are based on the quality of the
donor-patient match. The quality of the match is determined by characteristics of
patients and donors which are observable by doctors and veriable by means of med-
ical tests. For instance, the quality of a match can be measured according to some
objective criterion as the Lifetime Years From Transplant (LYFT) method that es-
timates the dierence between the remaining lifetime with and without transplant
for each candidate on the waiting list.8 Hence, patients' preferences are known for
6Hateld (2005) shows that the results are robust to arbitrary feasibility constraints. More recently,
Saidman et al. (2006) and Roth et al. (2007) show that eciency gains could be attained (and almost
exhausted) if kidney exchanges among three donor-patient couples and LPE were admitted. S onmez and
 Unver (2005); Roth et al. (2006) also analyze the potential benets of altruistic no-related {Samaritan{
donors in LPE.
7See Duquesnoy et al. (2003), Merion et al. (2005), Keizer et al. (2005), Klerk et al. (2004), Opelz
(1997), Kranenburg et al. (2004), and Schnitzler et al. (1999).
8See \Predicting the Life Years From Transplant (LYFT): Choosing a Metric", Scientic Registry for
Transplant Recipients working paper, May 16, 2007 at www.unos.org.
4the CTC and need not to be elicited.9
(ii) Patients are endowed with a reservation value over the minimal quality of the donor-
patient match required to accept a transplantation. The choice of receiving a given
kidney or continuing the dialysis treatment depends in fact on patient's eagerness
to receive an organ instead of continuing the dialysis and waiting for a better kid-
ney. Hence, each patient reservation value depends on how the patient subjectively
evaluates the quality of life under dialysis, her expectations about the quality of
future pools of kidneys available for exchange, and on her attitude towards risk and
uncertainty.10 Of course, patients reservation values are not observable and remain
private information.
In this scenario, we investigate whether we can construct rules such that revealing the
true reservation value is a dominant strategy for the patients. Surprisingly, we show that
in the presence of feasibility constraints, truthful revelation is not compatible with a weak
version of eciency.
In the light of the negative result that we obtain in the standard model, we propose
an alternative \behavioral" approach. KPE programs normally involve the coordination
of nephrology services and patients of several hospitals. In this environment, patients
have little information about the remaining patients involved in the program. Patients
may consider that by misreporting their own reservation values, they also could end
up losing the possibility of a benecial transplant. In fact, they could even receive an
undesirable kidney. Therefore, it becomes natural to assume that patients might prefer
to choose their strategies so as to \protect" themselves from the worst eventuality as far
as possible. We capture formally this \lexicographic maximin" behavior assumption with
the notion of` \protective behavior" proposed by Barber a and Dutta (1982) and later
axiomatized by Barber a and Jackson (1988). With his assumption on patients' strategic
9A possible problem is that, even doctors could be tempted to report strategically these information
to the CTC in order to favor their own patients. This is the justication for the approach in Roth et al.
(2004). The problem seems less relevant for European continental countries, where Transplant Services
are normally public and have more information and less coordination problems that those in US.
10The existence of patients' reservation values is consistent with the existence of Extended Donor Crite-
ria and the use of organs previously regarded as unsuitable, because improvements on immunosuppressive
treatment imply that even those low quality organs have good probability of survival. See Su et al. (2004);
Su and Zenios (2006).
5behavior, we reconcile the notion that patients only care about obtaining a kidney in
so far it is compatible with the evidence on the heterogeneity of compatible kidneys.
In this scenario, we show that truthful revelation of patients reservation values can be
attained despite the feasibility constraints. If kidney exchanges are restricted to involve
only pairs of donor{patient couples, then a plethora of rules provide (strong) incentives
for the patients to report their true reservation values. This is the case for priority
rules or rules that maximize a xed ordering over the set of feasible and individually
rational kidney assignments. The positive result vanishes however, if larger exchanges are
admitted. There are kidney allocation problems where if 3-way exchanges are feasible,
then truth-telling is a protectively dominated strategy. Thus, in some sense, our results
justify the possibility of introducing a pairwise kidney exchange in Europe, but also
provide additional theoretical support beyond the logistic reasons for concentrating on
the possibilities that arise in pairwise exchanges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the
model of kidney allocation problems and basic notation. In Section 3, we introduce the
concept of kidney asignment rules and some desirable conditions. In Section, 4 we present
an introductory impossibility result. In Section 5, we dene the protective behavior and
present the positive results. In Section 6, we conclude and discuss lines of further research.
2 Kidney Assignment Problems
Consider a nite society consisting of a set N = f1;:::;ng of patients (n > 3) who need a
kidney for transplantation. Each patient has a potential donor, and 
 = f!0;!1;:::;!ng
denotes the set of kidneys available for transplantation. The kidney !0 refers to the
situation in which a patient does not receive any kidney, while !i for each i 6= 0 refers
to the kidney of patient i's donor. We assume that each patient has only one potential
donor and that there are not kidneys without living donor.11
Each patient i is equipped with a complete and transitive preference relation %i on 
.
Patients' preferences are based on rankings expressed through objective, medical criteria
that measure the tness of each available kidney to each patient and that are observable by
11Hence, we focus on KPE. We discuss in the concluding section the possibility of multiple donors.
6the CTC.12 We express patients' preferences by using numerical valuations over kidneys.
For each i; j 2 N, we denote by vi(!j) i's valuation of kidney !j. For each i 2 N,
!;!0 2 
, we say patient i considers kidney ! at least as good as kidney !0, ! %i !0, if
and only if vi(!)  vi(!0). Of course, given %i the associated strict preference relation i
and the indierence relation i are dened in the standard way. We normalize in such a
way that for each i 2 N, and each ! 2 
 n f!0g, vi(!) 2 [0;1). If for some i 2 N and
! 2 
 vi(!) = 0, we say that patient i and kidney ! are incompatible. This reects
the possibility that patient i's body will reject the graft of kidney !, because of blood{
type incompatibility, positive crossmatch, or any other reason. We say that patient i and
kidney ! are compatible if vi(!) > 0.We assume that agents have strict preferences over
compatible kidneys, and therefore for each i 2 N and each !;!0 2 
 if vi(!) 6= 0 and
vi(!0) 6= 0, then vi(!) 6= vi(!0). A preference prole is a matrix P 2 Mnn and it is
dened by Pi;j  vj(!i) for each i;j 2 N. Preference proles contain all the information
about patients' observable priority rankings.
Each patient i is also endowed with a reservation value ri 2 (0;1). We interpret ri as
the valuation that patient i assigns to receive !0. Hence, ri  vi(!0). Reservation values
may incorporate patients' subjective valuation of being on dialysis and not receiving any
kidney, as well as the endogenous expectation of receiving a new organ in the future
from a new pool of donor{patient couples. We assume that for each patient i, ri > 0.
Thus, patients always prefer to stay on dialysis rather than receiving an incompatible
kidney. In order to be consistent with our assumption on strict preferences for compatible
kidneys, we assume that patients are never indierent between receiving a kidney and
not receiving a kidney and remaining on the waiting list. Thus, for each i and each
! 6= !0, ri 6= vi(!0). Given a patient i and a preference prole P, we denote by Ri 
fri 2 (0;1) j 8 ! 2 
 n f!0g;ri 6= vi(!)g the set of i's reservation values that are consistent
with P.13 Let R  i2NRi. We call r 2 R patients' reservation values prole. For each
i 2 N and each r 2 R, r i denotes the restriction of r to the patients in N n fig.
A (kidney exchange) problem K is a pair K = (P;r).
12These rankings may be based on the LYFT index {Life Years From Transplantation{ or any other
quality{eciency criteria.
13The reader should keep in mind that Ri depends on P. We are abusing notation but since P is
always a primitive of the analysis, there will not be room for confusion in the arguments.
7An assignment a is an n-tuple of pairs a = [(1;!);:::;(n;!0)] such that
(i) for each i;j 2 N, i 6= j and each !;!0 2 
 n f!0g, if (i;!);(j;!0) 2 a, then ! 6= !0.
(ii) if there are i;j 2 N such that (i;!j) 2 a, then (j;!0) = 2 a.
An assignment is an allocation of the available kidneys to the patients. By (i), an
assignment never allocates the same kidney to two dierent patients, unless that kidney
is the null kidney. By (ii), if the kidney of a patient's donor is assigned to another
patient, then the initial patient is not assigned the null kidney. For each patient i and
each assignment a, we denote by ai the kidney that patient i receives at a.
In every assignment, kidneys are allocated by forming exchange cycles of patient{
donors couples. In each exchange cycle, every patient receives a kidney from the donor
of some patient in the cycle and simultaneously her donor's kidney is transplanted to
another patient in the cycle. In an exchange cycle among k couples, all the kidneys
must be reaped from the donors and transplanted to the patients simultaneously. If this
constraint is not taken into account, once a donor's kidney is transplanted to another
patient, the donor of the recipient may reject to donate her kidney in order to avoid
any clinical complication involved in the operation. This fact implies that an assignment
among k couples involves 2k simultaneous operations. Since hospitals face evident logistic
restrictions, we incorporate such constraints in our analysis through a narrower denition
of feasible assignments.
For each assignment a, let a be the nest partition of the set of patients such that
for each p 2 a and each i 2 p:
(i) either there are j;j0 2 p, with ai = !j and aj0 = !i,14
(ii) or ai = !0.
Clearly, for each assignment a the partition a is unique and well-dened. We dene
the cardinality of a as the maxp2a#p.
The cardinality of an assignment refers to the size of the largest exchange cycle formed
in the assignment. Basically, it refers to the maximum number of simultaneous operations
14Note that j = j0 and i = j = j0 and then ai = !i are allowed.
8involved in an assignment. Of course, the concept of cardinality is crucial for our notion
of feasibility.
For each k 2 N, k  n, we say that the assignment a is k{feasible if a's cardinality
is not larger than k. Let Ak be the set of all k{feasible assignments.
An interesting case of feasibility restrictions appears when only immediate exchanges
between two couples are admitted. An assignment a is a pairwise-exchange assignment
(a 2 A2) if a satises that if for some i;j 2 N (i;!j) 2 a, then (j;!i) 2 a.
3 Kidney Assignment Rules
In this paper, we are interested in rules that select a (kidney) assignment for each (kidney
exchange) problem. An (assignment) rule is a mapping ' that selects an assignment
a for each problem K. For each patient i and each problem K = (P;r), we denote by
'i(P;r) the kidney assigned to i by ' at K. As we take patients' preferences prole P
as given, whenever there is no room for confusion, we drop P from the arguments and
simply write '(r).
The assignment selected by a rule can be interpreted as an optimal recommendation
that takes into account the preferences of the patients for the available kidneys and their
reservation values and that tries to nd a compromise between their (maybe conicting)
interests.
Every preference prole P together with a rule ' dene a revelation mechanism.
The revelation mechanism (or game form) species a set of players (the patients), a
set of strategies for each patient, the sets Ri that are consistent with P; and an outcome
function, '(P;). Note that the mechanism (P;') fails short of dening a game in normal
(strategic) form because P does not introduce the information about patients' preferences
about the possibility of receiving the null kidney !0.
Next, we present formal denition of the standard conditions for desirable rules. The
reader should keep in mind that all the conditions refer to a given observed preference
prole P.
Individual Rationality. For each i 2 N and each r 2 R, vi('i(r))  maxfri;vi(!i)g.
9k{Eciency. For each r 2 R, '(r) 2 Ak and there is no a 2 Ak such that for each
i 2 N ai %i 'i(r) and for some j 2 N, aj j 'j(P;r).
Individual rationality is a minimal participation constraint which takes into account
patient's right of refusing any transplant and receiving her donor's kidney. On the other
hand, k-eciency is the natural version of eciency taking into account the feasibil-
ity restrictions on the cardinality of the assignments because at most 2k simultaneous
operations can be carried out in the kidney exchange process. Of course, n-eciency
corresponds to the classical notion of (full) Pareto eciency when there are not feasibility
constraints.
4 Incentive-Compatibility and Feasibility Constraints
A central issue in the design of an optimal kidney exchange program is the use of all the
relevant information in the assignment of the available kidneys. Although doctors may
have all the information about the degree of compatibility and tness among patients and
kidneys that is imbedded in preference proles, there is a key piece of information that
remains private information for the patients and must be elicited for public use, their
reservation values. The objective of this section is to analyze whether we can construct
rule s that provide incentives to the patients to reveal their true reservation values in the
presence of feasibility constraints on the cardinality of the proposed assignments.
We are interested in rules that provide incentives for the patients to reveal their true
reservation values in all the games induced by the revelation mechanism (P;').
Strategy{proofness. For each i 2 N, each r 2 R, and each r0
i 2 Ri, 'i(r) %i
'i(r0
i;r i).
Strategy-proofness implies that reporting the true reservation value is a (weakly) domi-
nant strategy for every patient in all the games compatible with the revelation mechanism
y P and '. Note that strategy{proofness is weak in our framework because only reservation
values are private information. The justication for the requirements of strategy-proofness
is two{fold. On the normative side, if patients do not provide the correct reservation val-
ues, then the assignment selected by the rule may be based on incorrect information, and
10therefore it may represent a far from optimal recommendation to the society. On the
positive side, in order to compute patients' best strategies in the revelation game induced
by P and ', patients simply need to know their own reservation values.
The literature on the allocation of indivisible objects has extensively studied the prob-
lem of designing strategy{proof and individually rational assignment rules.15 When pa-
tients have strict preferences there is a natural way to assign the available kidneys among
the patients. We can simply use the Gale's top trading cycle procedure to allocate objects
in markets with individual property rights. According to this procedure, given a kidney
allocation problem, let every patient point to the donor with her favorite kidney. A top
trading cycle consists of patients such that each patient in the cycle points to the donor
of the next patient in the cycle. (A single patient may constitute a cycle, by pointing to
herself if her donor's kidney is her best preferred kidney or if she thinks that no available
kidney is acceptable and she prefers not to perform any operation). Since there is a nite
number of patients and kidneys, for each problem there is at least one top trading cycle.
Give each patient in a top trading cycle her best preferred kidney, and remove them from
the problem with her assigned kidney. Repeat the process until each patient receives a
kidney (maybe the null kidney). The resulting assignment is unique given that preferences
over compatible kidneys are strict.16 Moreover, the induced rule satises individual ra-
tionality, n-eciency, and strategy-proofness.17 A top trading cycle however, may involve
all the patients.
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and for each i 2 N, ri = 0:9. In this problem, the top trading cycle procedure selects the
assignment
 a = [(1;!2)(2;!3)(3;!4)(4;!1)] :
15See Gale and Shapley (1962); Shapley and Scarf (1974); Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (1999).
16Patients will rather pick the null kidney rather than receiving an incompatible kidney.
17See Roth and Postlewaite (1977); Roth (1982).
11Under  a, there is a top trading cycle that involves all the patients and every patient receives
her best preferred kidney. Every rule that satises individual rationality and 3-eciency
however, selects the assignment
a
0 = [(1;!2)(2;!4)(3;!0)(4;!1)]:
Clearly, for each i 2 N,  ai %i a0
2 and  a2 2 a0
2 but  a is not 3{feasible.
Our rst result shows that feasibility constraints may make it impossible to construct
ecient rules that provide the right incentives to the patients at every preference prole.
Theorem 1. For each 2  k  n   1, there are P such that no rule satises individual
rationality, k-eciency, and strategy-proofness.
Proof. We study two cases. We analyze rst the restriction to pairwise exchanges. Then,
we provide the proof for k  3. In both cases we exploit arguments similar to those em-
ployed in the literature of strategy-proof assignment rules in economies with indivisibilities
where the core is empty (k = 2) or multi-valued (k  3).18
Assume to the contrary there is a rule ' that satises individual rationality, 2-eciency,
and strategy-proofness for every P. Consider three patients f1;2;3g and a preference pro-











and so that for each i 2 f1;2;3g, and each ! = 2 f!0;!1;!2;!3g, vi(!) = 0. Thus,
!2 1 !3 1 !1, !3 2 !1 2 !2, and !1 3 !2 3 !3. In order to simplify notation, let
N = f1;2;3g. (By individual rationality, this is without loss of generality.)
Let r = (r1;r2;r3) = (0:6;0:6;0:6). By individual rationality and 2-eciency, ' se-
lects an assignment in which two patients exchange their donors' kidneys while the re-
maining patient receives the null kidney. We assume without loss of generality that
'(r) = [(1;!2);(2;!1);(3;!0)].
Next, let r0 = (r0
1;r0
2;r0
3) = (0:9;0:6;0:6). By strategy{proofness, '1(r0) = !2. Finally,
let r00 = (r00
1;r00
2;r0
3) = (0:9;0:9;0:6). By individual rationality and strategy-proofness,
'2(r) = !0: Then, '(r00) = [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)]. Note that the assignment a =
18See S onmez (1999).
12[(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)] is 2{feasible, and ai %i 'i(r00) for each i 2 N and a2 2 '2(r00).
Then, ' violates 2{eciency.
Next, we analyze the general case. Let k  3. Remember that k < n and then there
are at least k+1 patients. Assume to the contrary there is a rule ' that satises individual
rationality, k-eciency, and strategy-proofness for every P. Let the preference prole P
be such that for every i = 1:::;k + 1:
vi(!i+1) > vi(!i+2) > vi(!i) > vi(!) = 0;
8 ! 2 
 n f!0;!i;!i+1;!i+2g: (modulo k + 1):
Again, (by individual rationality, without loss of generality) simplify notation and let
N = f1;:::;k + 1g.
%1 %2 ::: %k 1 %k %k+1
!2 !3 ::: !k !k+1 !1
!3 !4 ::: !k+1 !1 !2
!1 !2 ::: !k 1 !k !k+1
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
Table 1: P: Theorem 1, Case k  3.
Let r 2 R be such that:
vi(!i+2) < ri < vi(!i+1) for each i 6= k + 1
vk+1(!k+1) < rk+1 < vk+1(!2)
Note that, by individual rationality either no object is assigned to any patient 1;:::;k+
1, or patient k + 1 receives !2, patient 1 receives the null object, and every other patient











Let r0 2 R be such that for each i 6= k 1, ri = r0
i and vk 1(!k 1) < rk 1 < vk 1(!k+1).
By strategy-proofness, 'k 1(r0) %k 1 'k 1(r) = !k. Note that !k is patient k 1's preferred
kidney. Then, 'k 1(r0) = !k. By k-eciency and individual rationality, '(r) = '(r0).
13Let  r 2 R be such that for each i 6= k + 1, r0
i =  ri and vk+1(!2) <  rk+1 < vk+1(!1).













Note that !1 = 'k+1( r) = '( r0
k+1;r0
 (k+1)) k+1 'k+1(r0) = !2, which contradicts strategy-
proofness.
The previous impossibility result is robust to the introduction of weak preferences
over kidneys. All we require is to admit the existence of two indierence classes for
acceptable kidneys. Hence, Theorem 1 contrasts with the positive results in dichotomous
domains of preferences by Roth et al. (2005a) and Hateld (2005). Moreover, the result
can be extended to incomplete information settings where patients may have incomplete
information (i.e. beliefs) about the reservaton values of the remaining patients. In a
result that parallels the results of Roth (1989), we can prove that there are preference
proles and sets of patients' beliefs about other patients' reservation values such that
there is no rule that satises individual rationality, k-eciency, and (Bayesian) incentive
compatibility.19
5 Protective Behavior in Kidney Exchange Problems
The previous section presents a negative result for kidney assignment rules. This neg-
ative result is particularly discouraging since we balance the enrichment of preference
domain with the increase in the information available to the CTC. Namely, we make
the assumption that patients' preferences over available kidneys are known by the CTC
because they depend on measurable and veriable characteristics of patients and donors,
like blood types of patients and donors, their age, health status, race, HLA mismatches,
etc. The fact that reservation values depend on unobservable patients' characteristics
however, introduces severe limitation on the properties that the kidney assignment rules
19A precise statement of this result can be found in Appendix A. In a recent paper, Villa and Pa-
trone (2008) prove that the rule that maximizes the sum of the welfare of the patients is not incentive
compatible.
14may satisfy. Thus, information on the patients' reservation values have to be elicited and
patients might be tempted to misreport such information to get better kidneys. In this
scenario, if patients waiting for a transplant are strongly risk-averse, they might prefer to
choose their strategies so as to \protect" themselves from the worst eventuality as far as
possible. This \lexicographic maximin" behavior assumption is captured by the notion
of \protective behavior".
Consider a preference prole P, a rule ' and a patient i who faces the revelation
mechanism (game form) dened by (P;').20
For each patient i, each pair of reservation values ri;si 2 Ri, and each real number
l 2 R, let:
c
ri(l;si) = fs i 2 R i j vi ('(P;(si;s i))) = lg:
Then, cri(l;si;) is the set of restricted proles of reservation values of the remaining
patients under which i receives a kidney ! with vi(!) = l when i announces si and her
true reservation value is ri.
Given P and ', for each patient i with reservation value ri 2 Ri, si;s0
i 2 Ri;
si protectively dominates s0
i , denoted si d(ri) s0
i if there exists l 2 R such that:
(i) cri(t;si) \ cri(t0;s0
i) = ? for each t  k and t < t0,
(ii) cri(l;si) ( cri(l;s0
i).
For each patient i and each ri 2 Ri, let D(ri)  fsi 2 Ri j there is nos0
i 2 Ri withs0
i d(ri) sig
be the set of protective strategies of patient i.
In order to compare two strategies according to this criterion an agent looks at the
utility level of the worst outcome (say t = min!2
 vi(!)). Strategy si protectively domi-
nates s0
i if two conditions hold. First, it never occurs that there exists a prole such that
20Throughout this section, we assume that all the information available to the CTC, namely P and
' is also available to the patients. The results are not altered however, if we only assume that patients
have information about the set of mutually compatible exchanges and not the whole preference prole P.
We maintain the assumption on common knowledge of preference proles just for the sake of clarity of
exposition and to avoid the introduction of additional notation. We delay the discussion on the incomplete
information case where patients only know her own preferences and reservation values to the end of this
section.
15strategy si induces this minimum utility level and strategy s0
i induces a higher level of
utility. Second, there are some proles such that s0
i induces the minimum level of utility,
while si induces a larger payo for patient i: If the rst condition holds but not the second
because cri(t;si) = cri(t;s0
i); then patient i repeats the comparison with respect to the
next to the worst utility level.
Clearly, the protective domination relation is not complete, but it is transitive. Thus,
for each reservation value ri 2 Ri, the set D(ri) is not empty. Moreover, if there is a
unique protective strategy, fsig = D(ri), then si d(ri) s0
i for each s0
i 2 Ri n fsig.
Truth{telling requires that reporting the true reservation value is a protective strategy
for the player at every direct revelation game generated by P and '. Protective domi-
nation however, is not a complete relation. Thus, if there are several dierent protective
strategies besides reporting the true value, then we could not say that truth{telling is an
optimal strategy for the patients. This fact calls for a stronger implementability require-
ment.
Let r; r 2 R. The reservation values prole  r is a protective equilibrium at r i
for each patient i,  ri 2 D(ri).
A rule ' is directly implementable via protective equilibria (DIPE) i for
each r; r 2 R such that  r is a protective equilibrium at r, '(r) = '( r).
With our focus on DIPE rules, we emphatize that there is no a priori reason why im-
plementation of rules should be achieved through equilibria involving truthful preference
revelation. In fact, focusing on the implementability of rules reects the consideration
that correct revelation is not an objective per se, and what we really care about is the
result of strategic behavior, rather than its correspondence to truth. The following re-
sult indicates, however, that the only rules which are implementable in our sense are
those which in fact guarantee truthful revelation by all patients, under the behavioral and
informational assumptions underlying the denition of protective equilibrium.
For each patient i, strategies si;s0
i 2 Ri are equivalent if for each s i 2 R i,
'i (si;s i) = 'i (s0
i;s i).
16Truth{telling is (essentially) the unique protective strategy for patient i
if for each ri 2 Ri,
D(ri) = fr
0
i j ri and r
0
i are equivalentg:
Our rst result in this section replicates Theorem 1 in Barber a and Dutta (1982).
Proposition 1. Let P 2 P. A rule ' is directly implementable via protective equilibria
if and only if for each patient i, truth-telling is essentially the unique protective strategy .
The proof of Proposition 1 mimics the proof Theorem 1 in Barber a and Dutta (1982),
and it is relegated to the Appendix. The proof consists of three steps. First, we prove
that the set of undominated strategies for non-equivalent reservation values (strategies)
are disjoint. Then, we show reservation values with the same sets of admissible kidneys
are equivalent. Finally, we check that revealing the true reservation value is indeed an
undominated strategy.
The following example shows that the dierence between truth{telling as a unique
protective strategy and strategy{proofness. There are proles for which no rule satises
individual rationality, 2-eciency, and strategy-proofness, but there exist rules that satisfy
individual rationality, 2-eciency, and such that truth-telling is the unique protective
strategy.
Example 2. Let N = f1;2;3g and let   be the rule that maximizes the number of trans-
plants obtained through pairwise exchanges, and ties are broken according to patient 1's












Let r2 2 R2. If s2 < 0:75, then
cr2(r2;s2) = fs 2 2 R 2 j s1 > 0:99 and s3 > 0:75g;
cr2(0:75;s2) = fs 2 2 R 2 j s1 < 0:99g;
cr2(0:99;s2) = fs 2 2 R 2 j s1 > 0:99 and s3 < 0:75g:
17If 0:75 < s0
2 < 0:99, then
cr2(r2;s0
2) = fs 2 2 R 2 j s1 > 0:99 or s3 > 0:75g;
cr2(0:99;s0
2) = fs 2 2 R 2 j s1 > 0:75 and s3 > 0:75g:
Finally, if s00
2 > 0:99, then cr2(r2;s00
2) = R 2.
Assume that r2 < 0:75, then for each s2 < 0:75, s2 is strategically equivalent to r2.
Moreover, for each s0
2 > 0:75, cr2(r2;r2) ( cr2(r2;s0
2). Using a similar argument for
r2 > 0:75, we can prove that truth-telling is (essentially) the unique protective strategy
for patient 2 . The same reasoning applies to the remaining patients, and therefore   is
DIPE. On the other hand, It is immediate to check that   violates strategy-proofness.
Let  r = (0:8;0:1;0:1) and r0
2 = 0:8, then  ( r) = [(1;!2);(2;!1);(3;!0)] and  (r0
2 r 2) =
[(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)]. Because !3 2 !1,  2(r0
2 r 2) 2  2( r). Notice that the violation
of strategy-proofness appears for reservation values prole where patient 2 is nor receiving
her worst preferred outcome.
In order to follow with the analysis of truth-telling as a protective strategy, we need
to introduce additional notation and denitions. Consider a patient i, (given P and ')
the set of possible outcomes for patient i a is dened by:

i  f! 2 
 such that there exists r 2 R with 'i(r) = !g:
With the denition of 
i at hand, for each problem reservation value ri 2 Ri the set




i (ri)  f! 2 
i such that vi(!)  maxfvi(!i);rigg:




i (ri)  f! 2 
i such that vi(!) < maxfvi(!i);rigg:
If ' satises individual rationality, then 'i(r) 2 

+





i ri)nf!0g vi(!) if 

+
i (ri) 6= ?, !+(ri))  ? otherwise; and !
 






i (ri) 6= ?, !
 
i (ri)  ? otherwise. Thus, !
+
i (ri) is i's worst acceptable kidney and
!
 
i (ri) is i's best unacceptable kidney. Note that if patient i's reservation value is lower
than her donor's kidney valuation, ri < vi(!i), then !
+
i (ri) = !i and !
 
i (ri) = ?.
At this point, we introduce two conditions that turn out to be necessary for truth-
telling being a unique protective strategy in our environment.









i), then 'i(r) = 'i(r0).
Weak Consistency. For each i 2 N, each r 2 R, and each ri 2 Ri, if 'i(r) = !0 and
ri < r0
i, then 'i (r0
i;r i) = !0.
Invariance requires that if a patient changes her reported reservation value, but this
change does not aect her set of acceptable kidneys, then the patient receives the same
kidney. Note that a rule satisfying invariance may be responsive to the cardinal informa-
tion of patients' reported reservation values. For instance, think of a serially dictatorial
(priority) rule that always picks the best feasible allocation for a given patient, and then
proceeds iteratively (serially breaking ties) according to a priority list that depends on
the reservation value reported by that rst patient on the list. Weak Consistency is a
convenient weakening of the Axiom of Choice for single-valued choice functions.21 Simply,
if a patient does not receive a kidney when she reports ri, then she cannot be assigned
to a compatible kidney when she raises her reservation value. Note that if a rule satises
individual rationality, then weak consistency applies the logic behind the Axiom of Choice
only at situations where the patients receive the worst possible outcome, the null kidney.
Proposition 2. For each preference prole P and each rule ', if ' satises individual
rationality and for each patient i truth telling is the unique protective strategy, then '
satises invariance and weak consistency.




i (ri) = ? and we need to prove that every si 2 Ri such that si < vi(!+(ri));
is equivalent to ri. Let si < vi(!i). By individual rationality, for each  s i 2 j6=iRj,
vi('i (si; s i))  vi(!i). Let  r i 2 j6=iRj be such that '(ri; r i) = !i. Because truth{
telling is the unique protective strategy for patient i, cri(vi(!i);ri)  cri(vi(!i);si) and
'(si; r i) = !i. Next, assume that i's true reservation value is si and let ~ r i 2 j6=iRj be
such that '(si;~ r i) = !i. Repeating the previous argument, individual rationality and the
fact that truth{telling is the unique protective strategy for i, imply that csi(vi(!i);si) 
21See Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971). We follow Hateld (2005) in the terminology.
19csi(vi(!i);ri), and '(ri;~ r i) = !i. Applying the same argument iteratively for each level
k > ri, we conclude that ri and si are equivalent.
Next, assume that ri > vi(!i) and that 

 
i (ri) 6= ?.22 Hence, we need to check that
every si 2 Ri such that
vi(!
 (ri)) < si < vi(!
+(ri))
is equivalent to ri. Let si 2 (vi(! (ri));vi(!+(ri))) By individual rationality and the
denitions of !
 
i (ri) and !
+
i (ri), for each  s i 2 j6=iRj, vi('i (si; s i))  ri. Let ^ r i 2
j6=iRj be such that 'i (ri;^ r i) = !0. Because truth{telling is the unique protective
strategy for patient i, cri(ri;ri)  cri(ri;si), and '(si;^ r i) = !0. Next assume that i's
true reservation value is si and let ~ r i 2 j6=iRj be such that '(si;~ r i) = !0. Repeating
the previous argument, individual rationality and the fact that truth{telling is the unique
protective strategy for i imply that csi(si;si)  csi(si;ri), and '(ri;~ r i) = !0. Applying
the arguments of the previous paragraph iteratively for each level k > ri, we conclude
that ri and si are equivalent. Finally note that the same argument suces to prove that
every si < vi(!
+
i (ri)) is equivalent to ri if ri > vi(!i) and 

 
i (ri) = ?, which completes
the proof of invariance.
We conclude with the proof of weak consistency. Note that by individual rationality,
for each k < maxfri;vi(!i)g, cri(k;ri) = ? and cri(maxfri;vi(!i)g;ri) 6= ?. Assume
that ' does not satisfy weak consistency, then there are i 2 N, and ri < r0
i such that
'i(r) = !0 and 'i (r0
i;r i) 6= !0. Note that, by individual rationality, ri > vi(!i). Then,
there is r0 2 R with r0
i > ri such that 'i(ri;r0
 i) = !0 but 'i(r0) 6= !0. By individual
rationality, 'i(r0) 2 

+
i (ri)nf!0g. Hence, by (i) of the denition of protective domination,
ri does not protectively dominates r0
i. Moreover, ri and r0
i are not equivalent strategies.
These facts contradict that truth{telling is essentially the unique protective strategy.
The next proposition shows that invariance and weak consistency are also sucient
if only pairwise exchanges are admitted.
Proposition 3. For each preference prole P, if the rule ' satises individual rationality,
2-eciency, invariance, and weak consistency, then for each patient i truth{telling is the
unique protective strategy.
22By individual rationality, this is always the case if vi(!i) 6= 0.
20Proof. Fix a patient i and a reservation value ri 2 Ri. By invariance, we need only prove







i (ri) 6= ?, and every s0
i = 2 (0;!
+
i (ri)] if !
 
i (ri) = ?.
Assume rst that ri < vi(!i). Then, !
+
i (ri) = !i. Note that, by individual rationality,
for each t < vi(!i), cri(t;ri) = ?. Let si 2 Ri be such that si > vi(!i) = !
+
i (ri). Clearly,
for each t  ri and each t0 > t, cri(t;ri)\cri(t0;si) = ?, which proves the (ii) of protective
domination. Next, consider ^ r 2 R such that ^ ri = si and for each patient j 6= i and each
! 2 
 n f!0g, ^ rj > vj(!). By individual rationality, for each j 2 N 'j(^ r) = !0. Then,
cri(ri;ri) = ? ( cri(ri;si) 6= ?, which proves condition (ii) of protective domination.
Next, assume that ri > vi(!i) and assume that !
 
i (ri) 6= ?. Let s0




i (ri)). By individual rationality, cri(t;ri) = ? for all t  vi(!
 
i (ri)). Let
j 2 N be such that !
 
i (ri) = !j.23 Consider the reservation values prole r0 2 R such
that r0
i = s0
i, for each l = 2 fi;jg and each ! 2 
 n f!0g, r0
l > vl(!); and vj(!i) >
r0
j. (Note that this is possible because !
 
i (ri) 2 
i.) By individual rationality and
k-eciency, 'i(r0) = !j and 'i(ri;r0
 i) = !0. Clearly, vi('i(ri;r0
 i))  ri > vi('i(r0)).
Hence cri(vi('i(r0));ri) ( cri(vi('i(r0));s0
i) 6= ?. This suces to prove that ri protectively
dominates s0
i.
We conclude by checking that if ri > vi(!i), then ri protectively dominates every s00
i 2
Ri such that s00
i > vi(!
+
i (ri))  ri. By individual rationality, for each t < ri; c
ri
i (t;ri) = ?.
Note that for each r 2 R such that r
i = ri and 'i(r) = !0, and for each si > ri, by weak
consistency, 'i(si;r
 i) = !0. Then, for each t0 > ri we have cri(ri;ri)\cri(t0;s00
i) = ? which
proves condition (i) of the denition of protective domination. The previous argument
implies that cri(ri;ri)  cri(ri;s00
i). In order to conclude the argument, we show that the
previous inclusion is proper. Let j 2 N be such that !+(ri) = !j. Consider the reservation
values prole r00 2 R such that r00
i = s00
i, vj(!i) > r00
j, and for each m = 2 fi;jg and each
! 2 
 n f!0g, vm(!) < rm. By individual rationality and k-eciency, 'i(ri;r00
 i) = !j
and 'i(r00) = !0. Hence cri(ri;ri) ( cri(ri;r00
i ) which proves condition (ii) of the denition
of protective domination.
The results in Propositions 2{3 are clearly positive. Under protective behavior, there is
a large class of rules that provide incentives for the patients to reveal their true reservation
23It is possible that j = i.
21values. This family includes every rule that maximizes a strict order over the set of ecient
and individually rational pairwise assignments. Hence, rules that maximize the number
of exchanges, or serial priority rules satisfy our axioms. In addition, the previous results
are in line with the results in Roth et al. (2005a) and Hateld (2005) despite we start
from dierent assumptions on patients' preferences and strategic behavior.
The previous result shows that when only pairwise exchanges are possible, under
protective behavior weak consistency is almost sucient for providing the right incentives
to patients. In the light of the arguments of the proof of Proposition 3, the result extends
to preference proles and rules in which for every patient every kidney in the set of possible
outcomes can be obtained through a pairwise exchange.24 This observation however, does
not hold generally. Our next result shows that the restriction on pairwise exchanges is
essential for the positive result. If larger cycles are possible, then truth{telling may fail
to be a protective strategy.
Proposition 4. Let ' be a rule that satises individual rationality and k-eciency for
some k  3. There are preference proles P such that if for some r 2 R #'(r) > 2 then
for some patient i ri = 2 D(ri).
Proof. Consider the following counterexample. Let N = f1;2;3g and let the preference













Let the rule ' satisfy individual rationality and 3-eciency. Individual rationality and
3-eciency imply that ' is dened according to Table 2 and Table 3.
r2 n r3 r3 > 0:9 r3 2 (0:75;0:9) r3 < 0:75
r2 > 0:9 [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)] [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)] [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)]
r2 < 0:9 [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)] [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)] [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)]
Table 2: r1 > 0:9
24This is the case for the preference prole presented in the proof of the case k = 2 of Theorem 1.
22r2 n r3 r3 > 0:9 r3 2 (0:75;0:9) r3 < 0:75
r2 > 0:9 [(1;!0);(2;!0);)3;!0)] [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)] [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)]
r2 < 0:9 [(1;!0);(2;!0);(3;!0)] [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)]
either [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)];
or [(1;!2);(2;!3);(3;!1)]:
Table 3: r1 < 0:9
Assume now that there is r 2 R such that #'(r0) = 3. That is, there is r such
that '(r) = [(1;!2);(2;!3);(3;!1)]. Necessarily, r1 < 0:9, r2 < 0:9, and r3 < 0:75. It
is immediate to compute: cr3(r3;r3) = cr3(r3;0:8) = f(s1;s2) j s2 > 0:9g. On the other
hand,
cr3(0:75;r3) 6= ?; cr3(0:75;0:8) = ?;
Note that
'3(r1;r2;0:8) = !2 3 !1 = '3(r):
If patient 3 reservation value is r3, then s3 = 0:8 protectively dominates r3. In this case,
by reporting s3 = 0:8, patient 3 is not taking any risk at the other patients' proles for
which she receives the null kidney. In the case of receiving an acceptable kidney however,
by reporting s3 = 0:8 she always gets her best preferred kidney. Interestingly, we have to
move beyond the rst round of comparisons between strategies to check domination.
Proposition 4 implies that at some preference proles rules individual rationality and
k-eciency, it is necessary to introduce limits on the cardinality of the recommended
exchanges in order to provide incentives for the patients to reveal their true reservation
values. The problem aects reasonable rules like priority rules and every rule that max-
imizes the number of (individually rational) exchanges. Hence, Proposition 3 provides
a strategic rationale for the focus on pairwise exchanges. Besides the logistic and direct
incentives problems described by Roth et al. (2005a), the restriction to pairwise exchanges
may be necessary to obtain the correct information from the patients in the protective
behavior scenario.
Two nal remarks are in order.
Proposition 4 depends crucially on the information available to the patients. In the
light of the proof, it is clear that it is not necessary that the patients have perfect knowl-
edge of the prefernece prole P. It suces that the patients know the sets of compatible
23kidneys of the remaining patients. If each patient only has information about her own
preferences, then the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 would apply to prove a gen-
eral version of Proposition 3. In such incomplete information framework, for each k  n,
if a rule ' satises individual rationality, k-eciency, invariance, and weak consistency,
then ' is DIPE.
Finally, in this article we have focused on situations where each patient has only one
possible donor. When patients can have multiple donors, it could be possible that a patient
may have incentives to withdraw some of her possible donors if by doing so the assignment
rule assigns her a better kidney. Again, with slight modications of the arguments in the
proof of Proposition 3, we can prove that rules that satisfy a version of Arrow's Axiom of
Choice (dened over feasible assignments) are immune to such manipulations.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a framework that departs from proposed by Roth et al.
(2005a) in the design of the New England kidney exchange clearing-house in two relevant
aspects. These departures try to convey some relevant institutional features of European
approach to kidney exchange. On the one hand, we assume that patients may have
heterogeneous preferences over the set of compatible kidneys. On the other hand, we
assume that the CTC may avail with detailed information about patients' preferences.
Our rst result shows the diculties to fulll dierent forms of incentive compatibility
if there are restrictions on the cardinality of feasible exchanges. The positive results are
restored if patients follow the protective behavior and are strongly averse to the risk of
refusing a transplant of a compatible kidney. Namely, if only pairwise kidney exchange are
feasible, then the rules which satisfy strategy-proofness and (constrained) eciency in the
dichotomous domain provide incentives for truthful revelation in the protective behavior
scenario. Interestingly, the diculties return if larger exchanges are admitted. These
results have policy implications. The eciency gains of making possible cycles larger
than pairwise exchanges can be overcome by the impossibility of eliciting the correct
information from the patients. Since the cost of slackening the feasibility constraints are
high, then our work puts some doubts on the economic advantage of these investments
for the healthcare service.
24In order to conclude, we devote a few lines to sketch some open venues of further
research. Evidently, our assumption on patients' (protective) behavior deserves to be
tested by means of controlled questionnaires on the population of patients in the waiting
lists. On the other hand, incentive problems in kidney exchange environments have been
studied on static model as ours. It is evident however, that kidney transplantation has a
dynamic component. It seems a promising line of new research the analysis of dynamic and
strategic models where patients and kidneys are available sequentially and simultaneously
living donation and kidney exchange are feasible procedures.25 In the light of the technical
diculties that appear in standard queue{management models, the analysis of protective
behavior in such settings is a promising line of investigation.
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287 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Incomplete Information about Other Patients'
Preferences
The results in Section 4 show the impossibility of obtaining the true values of the reser-
vation values of the patient in fully private information environments. In this Appendix,
we assume that patients do not know other patients' reservation values, but they do know
the probability distribution from which they are drawn. Since we deal with probabilities
we need to consider not only their preferences over kidneys (assignments) but also their
preferences over lotteries on assignments. Hence, in this section, we assume that patients
are expected utility maximizers.
A expected utility function is a function u : 
 ! R. For each each i 2 N,
P 2 Mnn, and each ri 2 Ri, u is consistent with patient i preferences if for each
!;!0 2 
, vi(!)  vi(!0), and for each probability p 2 [0;1] and lottery [p!;(1   p)!0]
which yields kidney ! with probability p and kidney !0 with probability (1 p), the utility
of the lottery is given by its expected utility pu(!)+(1 p)u(!0). Of course, a patient with
expected utility u we assume that prefers a lottery [p!;(1 p)!0] to any other alternative
 (which may or may not be a lottery itself) if and only if pu(!) + (1   p)u(!0) > u().
Clearly, vi is consistent with patient i's preferences, but there are many other consistent
utility functions, because an expected utility function reects not only the simple order
of her preferences over kidneys, but also a measure of their intensity.
Let F denote a probability distribution over n-tuples of utility functions. We call such
a probability distribution a information structure.
Given a preference prole P and a information structure F, a rule ' satises incentive
compatibility if for each r 2 R truth-telling for all the patients forms a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the Bayesian game dened by (P;r;';F). That is, for each patient i, each
r 2 R, each r0
i 2 Ri,and each ui consistent with patient i preferences
E[ui('(r) j F]  E[ui('(r
0
i;r i) j F]:
Our next result is an impossibility theorem that extends the negative conclusions of
Theorem 1. It says that in the incomplete information case, in equilibrium any revelation
mechanism cannot satisfy the joint requirements of k-feasibility, constrained eciency,
and individual rationality.
29Theorem 2. Let 2  k < n. There exist preference proles and states of information
[P;F] for which no rule that satises individual rationality,k-eciency, and incentive
compatibility.
Proof. Again, we consider the cases k = 2 and k > 2 separately.
Let k = 2 and consider the deterministic revelation mechanism ' that satises indi-
vidual rationality, k-eciency, and incentive compatibility. Consider three patients, 1, 2,











and the vi(!j) = 0 for each i 2 f1;2;3g, j = 2 f1;2;3g. Let the type distribution F
be such that Prob(r1 = 0:7) = p, Prob(r1 = 0:8) = (1   p), Prob(r2 = 0:7) = q ,
Prob(r2 = 0:8) = (1   q) for some p;q 2 (0;1), and Prob(r3 = 0:7) = 1. Assume without
loss of generality that '(0:7;0:7;0:7) = [(1;!2);(2;!1);(3;!0)]. By individual rationality
and k-eciency, '(0:8;0:8;0:7) = [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)] and we have four possibilities:
(i) '(0:8;0:7;0:7) = [(1;!2);(2;!1);(3;!0)] and '(0:7;0:8;0:7) = [(1;!3);(2;!0);(3;!1)].
By reporting r2 = 0:7, patient 2 receives kidney !1. By reporting r2 = 0:8, she re-
ceives !3 with probability q and the !0 with probability (1   q). If u2(!0) = 0 and
u2(!3) > 1
1 pu2(!1), then patient 2 prefers to report r2 = 0:8 even though her true
reservation value is r2 = 0:7, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
(ii) '(0:8;0:7;0:7) = [(1;!2);(2;!1);(3;!0)] and '(0:7;0:8;0:7) = [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)].
By reporting r2 = 0:7, patient 2 receives kidney !1. By reporting r2 = 0:8, she re-
ceives !3. Then, patient 2 always prefers to report r2 = 0:8 independently of her
true reservation value, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
(iii) '(0:8;0:7;0:7) = [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)] and '(0:7;0:8;0:7) = [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)].
By reporting r1 = 0:7, patient 1 receives kidney !2 with probability q and !0 with
probability (1   q) By reporting r2 = 0:8, she receives !0. Hence, patient 1, always
has an incentive to report r1 = 0:7, which contradicts incentive compatibility.
(iv) '(0:8;0:7;0:7) = [(1;!0);(2;!3);(3;!2)] and '(0:7;0:8;0:7) = [(1;!3);(2;!0);(3;!1)].
By reporting r1 = 0:7, patient 1 receives kidney !2 with probability q and !3 with
30probability (1 q). By reporting r2 = 0:8, she receives !0. If u1(!3) is close enough
to u1(!0) and u1(!2) is large enough, then patient 1 has an incentive to report
r1 = 0:7 even though her true reservation is r1 = 0:8, which leads to the desired
contradiction.
Next, we analyze the general case. Let k > 2. Assume to the contrary there is a rule
' that satises individual rationality, k-eciency, and incentive compatibility. Let P be
such that for every i = 1:::;k:
vi(!i+1) > vi(!i+2) > vi(!i) > vi(!) = 0; 8 ! 2 
 n f!0;!i;!i+1;!i+2g: (modulo k + 1);
and for patient k + 1, vk+1(!2) > vk+1(!1) > vk+1(!) = 0 for each ! 2 
 n f!1;!2g.
By individual rationality, without any loss of generality, we can focus on the assignment
restricted to the patients 1;:::;k + 1.
Consider type information distribution F be such that for each i 2 N nfk  1;k +1g,
Prob(vi(!i+2 < ri < !i+1) = 1, Prob(vk 1(!k 1 < rk 1  !k) = p, Prob(vk 1(!k+1 <
rk 1 < !k) = (1   p), Prob(vk 1(!k+1 < rk+1 < !2) = q, and Prob(vk+1(!2 < rk+1 <
!1) = (1   q).
Consider patient k   1. By reporting rk 1 2 (vk 1(!k 1;!k+1)), for  2 f0;1g, she
obtains with probability q, (!k;(1 )!k+1), and with probability (1 q) the kidney !k+1.
On the other hand, by reporting rk 1 2 (vk 1(!k+1;!k), she receives with probability q the
kidney !k and with probability (1   q) the null kidney !0. Normalizing uk 1(!0) = 0, if
 = 0, for all q 2 (0;1) there is uk 1 such that uk 1(!k) > 1
quk 1(!k+1), which contradicts
incentive compatibility. (Note that patient k   1 with such utility function would rather
report a higher reservation value than her true one.) Thus  = 1. Repeating the same
argument with patient k + 1 yields the desired contradiction.
7.2 Appendix B: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. It is obvious that if for each patient truth-telling is the unique
protective strategy then ' is DIPE. Hence, we focus on the converse result. Let ' be a
DIPE rule. We proceed thrugh a series of steps.
(a) If ri and r0
i are not equivalent, then D(ri) \ D(r0
i) = ?.
Let r
i 2 Ri. Assume to the contrary that r
i 2 D(ri) \ D(r0
i). Since ri and r0
i are not
equivalent, there is r i 2 R i such that 'i(ri;r i) 6= 'i(r0
i;r i). For each j 2 N n fig, let
31^ rj 2 D(rj). Since ' is DIPE, 'i(r
i;^ r i) = 'i(ri;r i) and 'i(r
i;^ r i) = 'i(r0
i;r i), which
is not possible.
(b) If ri and r0
i are such that 

+




i), then ri and r0
i are equivalent.
Note rst that both ri and r0
i together with P dene the same preference relation
%i. Let  ri 2 D(ri) and  r0
i 2 D(r0
i). Let ^ r i 2 R i be such that for every r i 2 R i,
'i( ri;r i) %i 'i( ri;^ r i). Because  ri 2 D(ri), 'i( ri;^ r i) = 'i( r0
i;^ r i). Using the same
argument with  r0
i, we conclude that the worst outcomes that i receives reporting  ri and
 r0
i are the same. Moreover, they receive such worst outcomes at the same reservation
values proles of the remaining patients. Repeating as many times as necessary the
same argument with the following utility levels, we prove that  ri and  r0
i are equivalent.
Therefore, by step (a), ri and r0
i are equivalent.
Remark 1. Since there is a nite number of patients and kidneys, steps (a) and (b) imply
that patients divide their strategy sets in a nite number of equivalence classes.
(c) D(ri) = fr0
i j ri and r0
i are equivalentg.
By steps (a) and (b), it suces to prove that ri 2 D(ri). Assume to the contrary
that there are i 2 N and r0
i 2 Ri such that r0
i = 2 D(r0
i). Since D(r0




i protectively dominates r0
i, there is r0





 i), and for each r0












i are not equivalent, by step (a), r1
i = 2 D(r1




i is not equivalent to r1




i;::: of i's reservation values such that for all t 2 N, rt






By step (b) there is a nite number of equivalence classes D(ri), there exist integers
T and S such that rT
i and r
T+S





also equivalent for h = 1;:::;T. In particular, r0
i and rT
i are equivalent.
Let now dene the sequence fr1
 i;:::;rS
 ig of elements of R i such that for each
































 i ) = 'i(r0
i;r0
 i).
On the other hand, by repeated application of the fact that ' is DIPE, we obtain that





 i ). In particular, 'i(rS
i ;r
S 1





 i), which contradicts that r0
i and rS
i are equivalent.
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